












































































	Terror	 Coefficient	 Standard	Error	 T	Value	 P	Value	
Support	Government	 .525	 .105	 		4.97	 0.000	
Support	Insurgents	 -.709	 .188	 -3.76	 0.000	
Contiguity	 1.409	 .139	 10.07	 0.000	
Constant	 -.227		 .139	 -2.70	 0.007	
N		 2,509	






intervention	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.		Terror	 Coefficient	 Standard	Error	 T	Value	 P	Value	
Troop	Deployment	
(Combatants)	
.332	 .145	 2.28	 0.022		
Weapons	 		-.406	 .177	 -2.29	 0.022	
Training	 		.166	 .141	 1.41	 0.239			
Material		 -.190	 .174	 -1.09	 0.275	
Unknown	Support	 .176	 .291	 0.61	 0.545	
Contiguity	 		1.06	 .141	 7.49	 0.000	
Constant	 -.020	 .084	 -0.24	 0.814	
N	 2,148	
R2	 .029				 Analysis	of	Model	2	provided	substantial	support	for	Hypothesis	4.	Model	2	indicated	that	deployment	of	ground	forces	served	as	a	strong	predictor	for	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	an	intervening	state.	As	indicated	in	Table	2,	an	intervening	state	that	deployed	ground	forces	in	a	combat	role	in	a	given	civil	conflict	was	predicted	to	experience	.332	more	terrorist	attacks	than	states	that	did	not	deploy	such	forces.	Additionally,	Model	2	indicated	that,	all	else	held	constant,	a	state	that	provided	weapons	to	an	actor	in	a	civil	conflict	would	experience	.406	fewer	terrorist	attacks,	which	further	suggests	that	only	warring	intervention	serves	as	a	significant	positive	predictor	of	terrorism.	That	the	remaining	intervention	variables	in	Model	2	did	not	constitute	statistically	significant	predictors	for	
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terrorism	similarly	strengthened	Hypothesis	4	since	they	also	indicated	various	types	of	non-warring	support.	This	supports	my	theory	that	forms	of	intervention	that	cause	increased	collateral	damage,	and	that	designate	the	intervening	state	as	a	secondary	warring	party	in	the	conflict,	should	lead	to	higher	rates	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.		The	findings	of	this	thesis	indicate	a	more	complex	relationship	between	third	party	state	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	than	my	theory	anticipated.		The	strong	negative	coefficients	associated	with	the	“Support	Insurgents”	and	“Weapons”	variables	suggested	that	certain	types	of	intervention	might	in	fact	decrease	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state3.	Though	this	contradicts	some	aspects	of	my	theory,	it	does	suggest	that	the	relationship	between	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states	depends	on	the	specific	nature	of	each	intervention.		Though	this	thesis	demonstrated	that	different	types	of	intervention	in	civil	conflict	could	affect	rates	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	in	different	ways,	the	bulk	of	variation	in	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	by	belligerents	in	a	civil	conflict	against	intervening	states	likely	depends	on	factors	independent	of	the	intervention	itself	and	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Model	1	produced	an	R2	value	of	.0447	while	Model	2	produced	an	R2	value	of	.029,	indicating	that	these	models	accounted	for	4.4%	and	2.9%	of	variation	in	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	against	intervening	states	respectively.																																																									3	Logistic	Regression	indicated	that	the	“Weapons”	and	“Support	Insurgents”	variables	did	not	serve	as	statistically	significant	predictors	for	terrorism.	
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	In	both	models,	a	state’s	contiguity	to	a	civil	conflict	zone	represented	the	strongest	predictor	of	terrorist	attacks	by	actors	within	that	civil	conflict	against	the	intervening	state.	Model	1	predicted	that	a	state	contiguous	to	a	civil	conflict	would	experience	1.4	more	terrorist	attacks	by	actors	within	that	conflict	than	would	a	state	that	did	not	share	a	border	with	the	state	in	which	the	conflict	took	place.	Model	2	produced	a	somewhat	lower	coefficient	of	around	1	for	the	contiguity	variable.	The	strength	of	the	contiguity	variable	is	likely	due	to	cases	in	which	insurgent	organizations	actively	pursue	related	political	goals	in	multiple	contiguous	states.	The	Taliban’s	involvement	in	both	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	likely	presents	a	typical	example	of	how	contiguity	can	lead	a	belligerent	in	one	civil	conflict	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	to	pursue	goals	in	a	contiguous	state	not	necessarily	related	to	that	state’s	intervention	in	the	primary	conflict.	Though	the	models	examined	in	this	thesis	account	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	variation	in	rates	of	international	terrorism	against	states	that	intervene	in	civil	conflicts,	they	sufficiently	indicated	that	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	could	lead	to	increased	rates	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	if	such	interventions	provide	direct	warring	support	to	a	belligerent	in	that	conflict,	support	a	government,	or	if	the	intervening	state	shares	a	border	with	the	civil	conflict	area.		
Case	Study	France’s	intervention	against	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	Syria	provides	an	illustrative	case	study	of	how	warring	intervention	against	insurgents	classified	as	terrorist	organizations	can	result	in	terrorist	reprisals	against	the	intervening	state.	France	began	to	launch	airstrikes	against	Islamic	State	targets	in	Iraq	in	2014	and	
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later	in	Syria	in	2015	(France	launches	first	air	strikes	2015),	in	coordination	with	an	international	coalition	led	by	the	United	States	(Valls	2015).	These	airstrikes	supported	the	Iraqi	government,	as	well	as	moderate	insurgents	and	Kurdish	Peshmerga	fighters	engaged	in	combat	with	IS	fighters	on	the	ground	in	Syria	(Valls	2015).	In	2015	then	French	Prime	Minister	Manuel	Valls	gave	a	speech	to	the	French	parliament,	which	outlined	the	general	strategy	and	rationale	behind	France’s	intervention	in	Syria.	In	this	speech,	Valls	identified	IS	as	an	imminent	threat	to	French	security	due	to	its	utilization	of	terrorist	tactics,	efforts	to	recruit	French	civilians,	and	destabilizing	effect	on	the	middle-east	that	produced	large	amounts	of	refugees	from	Iraq	and	Syria	(Valls	2015).	Many	of	these	refugees	eventually	sought	asylum	in	France	(Valls	2015).	That	IS	often	utilized	French	language	social	media	in	its	recruitment	efforts	posed	particular	concern	due	its	potential	capability	to	inspire	French	citizens	sympathetic	to	IS	to	carry	out	terrorist	attacks	against	the	French	state	(Valls	2015).		Valls’s	statement	clearly	illustrates	why	a	state	may	intervene	in	a	civil	conflict	in	a	calculated	attempt	to	minimize	its	risks	of	falling	victim	to	terrorist	attacks	by	belligerents	within	that	conflict.	The	civil	conflicts	in	Syria	and	Iraq	created	conditions	of	lawlessness	that	enabled	IS	to	successfully	seize	and	govern	territory	within	the	civil	conflict	area.	Prior	to	French	intervention,	IS	had	identified	France	as	a	potential	target	and	had	made	considerable	efforts	to	find	recruits	using	French	language	propaganda.	For	these	reasons,	the	French	calculated	that	it	was	within	their	interests	to	degrade	and	destroy	IS,	but	found	it	excessively	costly	as	well	as	politically	and	logistically	unfeasible	to	deploy	ground	forces.	To	overcome	
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these	challenges,	the	French	government	decided	to	utilize	the	Iraqi	government,	moderate	Syrian	rebels,	and	the	Kurdish	Peshmerga	as	agents	in	its	fight	against	Islamic	State.	In	doing	so,	however,	France	may	have	increased	the	strategic	incentive	for	IS	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	against	it	since	any	action	that	coerced	France	to	end	its	air	campaign	could	help	to	restructure	the	balance	of	power	in	Syria	and	Iraq	in	IS’s	favor.		IS	did	in	fact	deploy	terrorist	tactics	against	Paris	shortly	after	France	began	its	military	campaign	in	Syria.	On	November	13,	two	months	after	France	began	its	campaign	of	airstrikes	in	Syria,	seven	men	armed	with	assault	rifles	and	explosives	conducted	coordinated	attacks	against	the	Stade	de	France,	restaurants,	and	the	Bataclan	concert	hall	(Callimachi	2015).	These	attacks	killed	a	total	of	130	civilians.	The	following	day,	Islamic	State	published	a	message	online	claiming	responsibility	for	the	attacks	(Callimachi	2015).	In	this	message,	Islamic	state	claimed	that	it	had	orchestrated	the	2015	Paris	attack	in	retaliation	for	France’s	use	of	airstrikes	in	Iraq	and	Syria,	claiming	that	more	attacks	would	follow	if	France	continued	to	support	the	US-led	coalition	(Dalton	et	al	2015).	French	intelligence	officials	confirmed	IS’s	claim,	and	French	president	Francois	Hollande	released	a	statement	that	condemned	IS	as	the	perpetrators	of	the	attack	(Callimachi	2015).		French	intelligence	officials	stated	that	the	seven	men	who	carried	out	the	attack	had	maintained	personal	correspondence	with	Islamic	State	personnel	in	Iraq	and	Syria	while	planning	their	attack	(Dalton	et	al	2015).		The	2015	Paris	attacks	provide	a	clear	example	of	how	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	in	order	to	combat	a	terrorist	threat	can	itself	provoke	a	terrorist	response.	
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According	to	the	message	in	which	IS	claimed	responsibility	for	the	Paris	attacks,	IS	intended	for	these	attacks	to	make	the	cost	of	continuing	airstrikes	sufficiently	high	that	France	would	cease	its	campaign.	As	noted	in	the	literature	review,	however,	it	remains	unclear	whether	terrorist	organizations’	stated	goals	actually	reflect	the	underlying	strategy	behind	their	use	of	terrorist	tactics.	Alternatively,	Islamic	State	may	have	sought	to	utilize	the	Paris	attacks	to	build	credibility	amongst	potentially	sympathetic	populations,	and	thus	increase	their	recruitment	prospects.	The	strong	positive	reaction	elicited	among	extremists	on	social	media	in	the	wake	of	the	Paris	attacks	lends	some	credibility	to	the	potential	value	of	such	a	strategy.	Finally,	Islamic	State	may	have	intended	to	utilize	the	Paris	attacks	to	provoke	French	retaliation,	thus	increasing	collateral	damage	and	the	social	conditions	that	can	encourage	civilians	to	support	extremist	organizations.	This	rationale,	however,	seems	unlikely	since	Islamic	State	is	not	a	network-based	organization	but	rather	a	self-styled	caliphate	that	seeks	to	govern	its	territory	as	a	legitimate	state,	and	would	thus	suffer	acutely	if	its	cities	and	infrastructure	were	damaged.			Regardless	of	the	strategic	intent	of	the	attacks,	France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	increased	the	likelihood	that	Islamic	State	would	utilize	terrorist	tactics	against	it.	If	Islamic	State	sought	to	bolster	its	recruitment	potential	by	achieving	a	symbolic	victory	over	a	perceived	enemy,	attacking	a	target	actively	involved	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	had	greater	political	value	than	attacking	an	uninvolved	target.	If	Islamic	State	sought	to	provoke	a	strong	military	response	that	would	result	in	collateral	damage,	it	would	likely	prefer	to	choose	a	target	already	involved	in	the	civil	conflict	since	that	state	would	have	already	expressed	its	
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willingness	to	intervene.	In	such	a	situation	the	intervening	state	would	merely	have	to	intensify	its	military	campaign,	while	a	state	not	engaged	in	the	conflict	would	have	to	make	the	initial	choice	to	intervene.	Regardless	of	whether	Islamic	State	orchestrated	the	2015	Paris	attacks	primarily	in	pursuit	of	its	stated	goals	or	in	order	to	bolster	its	recruitment	capabilities,	France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	provoked	the	attack.	This	would	accord	with	the	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis.		
Conclusion		 France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	clearly	demonstrate	both	why	a	state	might	intervene	in	a	civil	conflict	in	a	calculated	attempt	to	target	terrorist	organizations,	and	how	intervention	may	itself	provoke	terrorist	reprisals.	The	complexity	of	the	relationship	between	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states,	and	the	abundant	disagreement	in	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	this	relationship,	makes	understanding	the	unique	effects	of	specific	types	of	intervention	both	an	important	area	of	study	and	a	crucial	policy	concern.	The	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis	support	my	theory	that	the	relationship	between	third	party	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	an	intervening	state	depends,	in	part,	on	what	tactics	that	state	utilizes	during	its	intervention,	and	on	what	type	of	actor	the	state	supports.	Specifically,	warring	interventions	and	interventions	that	support	governments	seem	to	lead	to	increased	rates	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	while	non-warring	interventions	and	those	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	generally	do	not.	
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	 These	findings	suggest	that	states	considering	warring	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	or	intervention	on	behalf	of	a	government	should	carefully	consider	the	potential	for	terrorist	reprisals	in	their	initial	cost-benefit	analysis	prior	to	intervention.	If	such	states	still	calculate	intervention	as	within	their	best	interests,	they	should	take	care	to	strengthen	their	domestic	security	apparatuses	to	prepare	for	terrorist	reprisals.	Conversely,	states	considering	a	non-warring	intervention	or	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgents	may	weigh	the	potential	for	terrorist	reprisals	more	lightly,	though	the	potential	for	such	reprisals	remains	present.		Though	this	thesis	found	statistically	significant	relationships	between	certain	types	of	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	frequency	of	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states,	my	models	accounted	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	variation	in	the	frequency	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	Other	factors	regarding	the	nature	of	intervening	states,	supported	actors,	and	the	conflicts	themselves	likely	contribute	to	the	probability	of	terrorist	reprisals	following	an	intervention.	Future	empirical	studies	should	attempt	to	create	more	robust	models	of	the	relationship	between	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	retaliation.	Nonetheless,	this	thesis	succeeded	in	its	goal	of	demonstrating	that	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states	likely	depends	on	the	specific	nature	of	each	intervention.					
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	Appendix	Tables	3	and	4	respectively	display	results	from	Model	1	and	Model	2’s	logistic	regression	analyses.	
Table	3:	Logistic	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	actor	
supported	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	
	Terror	 Coefficient	 P	Value	
Support	Government	 1.91	 0.000	
Support	Insurgents	 -.168	 0.685	
Contiguity	 2.79	 0.000	
N	 2,509	
Pseudo	R2	 0.197		
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Table	4:		Logistic	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	
intervention	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	
	Terror	 Coefficient	 P	Value	
Troop	Deployment	
(Combatants)	
2.53	 0.000	
Weapons	 .074	 0.836	
Training	 -.525	 0.077	
Material	 -.084	 0.830	
Unknown	Support	 1.14	 0.049	
Contiguity	 2.47	 0.000	
N	 2,148	
Pseudo	R2	 0.181	
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